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A study on the role of United Nations in controlling arms

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Abstract
Scholars and practioners of International relations have devoted attention to prevent arms-race. In recent years, the United Nations then, World Bank, United States and other governments have revamped their institutional architecture for addressing prevention in Arm-race for peace-building. The relationship between weak states and durability of arms race has acquired new emphasis in IR research. This article analyzes recent conceptual developments in prevention of arms-race, for peace building relating them to new thin king. It then analyzing international architecture for addressing prevention in arm-race, helpful in peace building and analyzing likely policy challenges in the near future. We argue that despite important analytic insights and institutional changes serious challenges persist in effort to prevent war from recurring.

Keywords: arms-control, peace-building, international atomic energy agency, role of security council, avoidance of armed-conflicts, outer space arms, nuclear weapons

Introduction

An arms race denotes a rapid increase in the quantity or quality of instruments of military power by rival states in peacetime. The first modern arms race took place when France and Russia challenged the naval superiority of Britain in the late nineteenth century. Germany's attempt to surpass Britain's fleet spilled over into World War I, while tensions after the war between the United States, Britain and Japan resulted in the first major arms-limitation treaty at the Washington Conference. The buildup of arms was also a characteristic of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, though the development of nuclear weapons changed the stakes for the par. Over the past century, the arms race metaphor has assumed a prominent place in public discussion of military affairs. But even more than the other colorful metaphors of security studies–balance of power, escalation, and the like–it may cloud rather than clarify understanding of the dynamics of international rivalries.

An arms race denotes a rapid, competitive increase in the quantity or quality of instruments of military or naval power by rival states in peacetime. What it connotes is a game with a logic of its own. Typically, in popular depictions of arms races, the political calculations that start and regulate the pace of the game remain obscure. As Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., has noted, "The strange result is that the activity of the *other* side, and not one's own resources, plans, and motives, becomes the determinant of one's behavior." And what constitutes the "finish line" of the game is the province of assertion, rather than analysis. Many onlookers, and some participants, have claimed that the likelihood of war increases as the accumulation of arms proceeds apace.

The first competitive buildup in which contemporaries used the arms race metaphor seems to have been the naval rivalry in the late nineteenth century, in which France and Russia challenged Britain in the context of acute tensions over colonial expansion. The British responded with a determination to remain masters of the seas. The ultimate result was not war, but rather an Anglo-French political settlement in 1904 and an Anglo-Russian rapprochement in 1907 against the background of a rising German threat.

The German challenge to Britain in the early twentieth century involved the most famous naval arms race of all. As the post-Bismarck political leadership decided that Germany must become a world power, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was able to justify building a large German battle fleet. When the British finally responded, the upshot was a competition that fit an action-reaction model more closely than any other arms race. The Germans in the end could not keep up, because of domestic difficulties in raising taxes and pressures to give greater priority to spending on the army. Though the naval arms race did poison Anglo-German relations, it was the actions of the German army, not the German navy that ultimately produced war in 1914.

A third major naval arms race, involving the United States, Britain, and Japan, erupted at the end of World War I. It was fueled by Japanese efforts to expand their political influence in East Asia and by an American attempt to gain greater political leverage over Britain. This was a race that, for financial reasons, none of the participants wanted to run very far. It ended at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 with the first major arms-limitation treaty ever and a new political settlement for East Asia.

Similarly, Adolf Hitler was in a rush to attack France in 1940 and the Soviet Union in 1941, partly because of the dynamics of an arms race that he had started in the 1930s. Held back by domestic financial constraints, Britain and France had lagged behind. But they, and Germany's other adversaries, had accelerated their rearmament in the late 1930s, and Hitler

moved forward his program of conquest lest the German lead be overtaken.

Japan, too, succumbed to "now or never" calculations in 1941. Its naval leaders appreciated that the Japanese navy had gained a lead over the U.S. Pacific Fleet in every class of warship, but that a massive American naval program begun in 1940 would leave them far behind by 1943. Coupled with the effects of an American oil embargo against Japan, this playing out of the dynamics of an arms race helped to prompt an attack on the United States in December 1941 (see Pearl Harbor, Attack on). But in this case, as in the two European wars, hegemonic political ambitions fueled the conflict.

Leads and lags in an arms race against a background of a hegemonic struggle characterized the Cold War as well, but the deterrent effect of weapons of mass destruction made "now or never" calculations much less tempting for the superpowers of the nuclear age. The arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union did not fit an action-reaction model very well. For domestic political and economic reasons, the United States was slow to rearm in the late 1940s even as it perceived hegemonic ambitions on the part of the Soviets. After the United States did greatly increase its nuclear and conventional arms during the Korean War, the Soviet leadership for its own domestic reasons made only a partial response. When from the mid-1960s the Soviets undertook the most massive peacetime military buildup in history, the United States chose to disengage somewhat from the race. Not until after 1979 did it reassess its posture. The new qualitative improvements embodied in the last American arms spurt of the Cold War made Soviet military leaders nervous and helps explain why they were willing in the mid-1980s to accept the new ideas promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev in hopes of raising the technological level of Soviet society. The arms race that had produced the greatest anxiety among contemporaries ended in the most astonishing political settlement of the past century.

Need of Arms-Control

Due to following reasons arms controlling has inspired

Armament creates hurdle in the public welfare activities. Vast amount has to spent on the development of arms. If a small amount of the amount spends on, the development of arms spend on the Public Welfare works. Then the earth will look prosper and happy like heaven. Armament invites the possibilities of war. Due to arms race many nations hoarded arms on a large scale. Arms power inspires leaders to exhibit it by war leaders want to prove the need of expenditure on arms development by war. In is Cloud says" Arms preparations inspire leaders of war. Armament provides opportunity to arms supplier nations to interfere into internal matters of developing countries especially. Developed nations in the name of arms and technology of arms production supply begin to interfere in the freedom of importing nations political as well as economical for e.g. U.S.A. by 'N.A.T.O.', 'S.E.A.T.O', 'C.E.N.T.O' and U.S.S.R. by 'VARSA PACT' exported arms to its member countries and by taking them into confidence, started to interfere into their economy. To prevent the possibilities of atomic war, the effective way is arms control. Atomic and nuclear arms have created terror in the world. So by imposing restrictions on arms production can be helpful for world peace. Armament is a way for human race for extinction, whole world has sit on the heap of ammunition. The stock of arms available so dreadful that it can become earth free from living beings many time. Attempts for disarmament and controlling of arms are being made from many year ago and are going on even today by U.N.O. We can describe the attempts done by U.N.O in this way-

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was founded on 24 January 1946 by Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly resolution "to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.

The General Assembly asked the Commission to "make specific proposals: (a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; (b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; (c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; (d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions."

On 14 December 1946, the General Assembly passed a follow-up resolution urging an expeditious completion of the report by the Commission as well as its consideration by the United Nations Security Council [2]. The Security Council received the report on 31 December 1946 and passed a resolution on 10 March 1947, "recognizing that any agreement expressed by the members of the Council to the separate portions of the report is preliminary" and requesting a second report to be made [3]. On 4 November 1948, the General Assembly passed a resolution stating that it had examined the first, second and third reports of the Commission and expressed its deep concern at the impasse which had been reached, as shown in its third report On 14 June 1946, the States representative to the Commission, Bernard, presented the Baruch Plan, wherein the United States (at the time the only state possessing atomic weapons) would destroy its atomic arsenal on the condition that the U.N. imposed controls on atomic development that would not be subject to United Nations Security Council veto. These controls would allow only the peaceful use of atomic energy. The plan was passed by the Commission, but not agreed to by the Soviet Union who abstained on the proposal in the Security Council. Debate on the plan continued into 1948, but by early 1947 it was clear that agreement was unlikely.

The UN General Assembly officially disbanded UNAEC in 1952, although the Commission had been inactive since July 1949.

Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) is the abbreviated name of the 1963 Treaty inning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which prohibited all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground. It is also abbreviated as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT): - and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT), though the latter may also refer to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which succeeded the PTBT for ratifying parties.

Negotiations initially focused on a comprehensive ban, but

this was abandoned due to technical questions surrounding the detection of underground tests and Soviet concerns over the intrusiveness of proposed verification methods. The impetus for the test ban was provided by rising public anxiety over the magnitude of nuclear tests, particularly tests of new thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs), and the resulting nuclear fallout. A test ban was also seen as a means of slowing nuclear proliferation and the nuclear. Though the PTBT did not halt proliferation or the arms race, its enactment did coincide with a substantial decline in the concentration of radioactive particles in the atmosphere.

The PTBT was signed by the governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States in Moscow on 5 August 1963 before being opened for signature by other countries. The treaty formally went into effect on 10 October 1963. Since then, 123 other states have become party to the treaty. Ten states have signed but not ratified the treaty.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose

Objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty entered into force in 1970. As required by the text, after twenty-five years, NPT Parties met in May 1995 and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. More countries have adhered to the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the treaty's significance. As of August 2016, 191 states have adhered to the treaty, though North Korea, which acceded in 1985 but never came into compliance, announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, following detonation of nuclear devices in violation of core obligations. Four UN member states have never accepted the NPT, three of which are thought to possess nuclear weapons: India, Israel, and Pakistan. In addition, South Sudan, founded in 2011, has not joined.

The treaty defines nuclear-weapon states as those that have built and tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967; these are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China. Four other states are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, and Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel is deliberately regarding its nuclear weapons status.

The NPT is often seen to be based on a central bargain:

The NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Even though the treaty was originally conceived with a limited duration of 25 years, the signing parties decided, by consensus, to unconditionally extend the treaty indefinitely during the Review Conference in New York City on 11 May 1995, culminating successful U.S. government efforts led by Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr.

At the time the NPT was proposed, there were predictions of 25–30 nuclear weapon states within 20 years. Instead, over forty years later, five states are not parties to the NPT, and they include the only four additional states believed to possess nuclear weapons. Several additional measures have been adopted to strengthen the NPT and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime and make it difficult for states to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons, including the export controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the enhanced verification measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol.

Critics argue that the NPT cannot stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the motivation to acquire them. They express disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 22,000 warheads in their combined stockpile and have shown a reluctance to disarm further. [*dubious*] Several high-ranking officials within the United Nations have said that they can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to produce nuclear weapons.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union the Cold War superpowers on the issue of arms control. The two rounds of talks and agreements were SALT I and SALT II.

Negotiations commenced in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969 [1]. SALT I led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries. Although SALT II resulted in an agreement in 1979, the United States Senate chose not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which took place later that year. The Soviet legislature also did not ratify it. The agreement expired on December 31, 1985 and was not renewed.

A belief commonly held during this time was that the Helsinki negotiations were designed to completely terminate the military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, or result in ultimate cooperation between the two countries. This was not the case, considering neither of the countries were ready to disarm themselves, rendering themselves totally vulnerable to the opposing side.

The talks led to the STARTs, or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, which consisted of START I (a 1991 completed agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union) and START II (a 1993 agreement between the United States and Russia, which was never ratified by the United States), both of which proposed limits on multiple-warhead capacities and other restrictions on each side's number of nuclear weapons. A successor to START I, New START, was proposed and was eventually ratified in February 2011.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) is the abbreviated name of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-

Range Missiles, a 1987 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (and later its successor states, in particular the Russian Federation). Signed in Washington, D.C. by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on 8 December 1987, the treaty was ratified by the United States Senate on 27 May 1988 and came into force on 1 June 1988.

The INF Treaty eliminated all nuclear and conventional missiles, as well as their launchers, with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometers (310–620 mi) (short-range) and 1,000–5,500 km (620–3,420 mi) (intermediate-range). The treaty did not cover sea-launched missiles [3]. By May 1991, 2,692 missiles were eliminated, followed by 10 years of on-site verification inspections.

START (**Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty**) was a bilateral treaty between the United States of America and the Union (USSR) on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. The treaty was signed on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994 [1]. The treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers. START negotiated the largest and most complex arms control treaty in history, and its final implementation in late 2001 resulted in the removal of about 80 percent of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence. Proposed by United States President Ronald Reagan, it was renamed START I after negotiations began on the second START treaty.

The START I treaty expired 5 December 2009. On 8 April 2010, the replacement New START treaty was signed in Prague by U.S. President Barack Osama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Following ratification by the Senate and the Federal Assembly of Russia, it went into force on 26 January 2011.

The START proposal was first announced by United States President Ronald Reagan in a commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College on 9 May 1982, [2] and presented by President Reagan in Geneva on 29 June 1982. Reagan proposed a dramatic reduction in strategic forces in two phases, which he referred to as SALT III at the time [3]. The first phase would reduce overall warhead counts on any missile type to 5,000, with an additional limit of 2,500 on ICBMs. Additionally, a total of 850 ICBMs would be allowed, with a limit of 110 "heavy throw" missiles like the SS-18, with additional limits on the total "throw weight" of the missiles as well. The second phase introduced similar limits on heavy bombers and their warheads, and other strategic systems as well.

At the time the US had a commanding lead in strategic bombers. The US B-52force, while aged, was a credible strategic threat but was only equipped with AGM-86 cruise missiles, beginning in 1982, because of Soviet air defense improvements in the early 1980s. The US also had begun to introduce the new B-1B Lancer quasi-stealth bomber and was secretly developing the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) project that would eventually result in the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. The USSR's force was of little threat to the US, on the other hand, as it was tasked almost entirely with attacking US convoys in the Atlantic and land targets on the Eurasian landmass. Although the USSR had 1,200 medium and heavy bombers, only 150 of them (Tupolev Tu-95s and Myasishchev M-4s) could reach North America (the latter only with in-flight refueling). They also faced difficult problems in penetrating the admittedly smaller and less heavily defended US airspace. Possessing too few bombers available when compared to US bomber numbers was evened out by the US forces having to penetrate the much larger and heavier defended Soviet airspace. This changed when new Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers appeared in 1984 equipped with the first Soviet AS-15 cruise missiles. By limiting the phase-in as it was proposed, the US would be left with a strategic advantage, for a time.

As *Time* magazine put it at the time, "Under Reagan's ceilings, the US would have to make considerably less of an adjustment in its strategic forces than would the Soviet Union. That feature of the proposal will almost certainly prompt the Soviets to charge that it is unfair and one-sided. No doubt some American arms-control advocates will agree, accusing the Administration of making the Kremlin an offer it cannot possibly accept—a deceptively equal-looking, deliberately nonnegotiable proposal that is part of what some suspect is the hardliners' secret agenda of sabotaging disarmament so that the US can get on with the business of rearmament." However, *Time* did point out that, "The Soviets' monstrous ICBMs have given them a nearly 3-to-1 advantage over the US in 'throw weight'—the cumulative power to 'throw' megatons of death and destruction at the other nation."

Negotiations

Continued negotiation of the START process was delayed several times because US agreement terms were considered non-negotiable by pre-Gorbachev Soviet rulers. President Reagan's introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program in 1983 was viewed as a threat by the Soviet Union, and the Soviets withdrew from setting a timetable for further negotiations. Due to these facts, a dramatic nuclear arms race proceeded during the 1980s, and essentially ended in 1991 by nuclear parity preservation at a level of more than ten thousand strategic warheads on both sides.

Points to Remember

1. To maintain peace and security of world arms controlling is the need of time.
2. The world's arm controlling became effective after World War 2.
3. U.N.O. founded on 24th October 1945 and many provisions included in its Charter about disarmament and controlling arms.
4. Article 24 of U.N.O Charter handed over the responsibility of arms controlling to Security Council.
5. Article 47 of U.N.O Charter describes the assistant of military staff committee for help to Security Council.
6. In 1946, the Atomic Energy Commission and in 1947, Commission on Traditional Arms founded.
7. In 1963, PTBT held and in 1970, NPT held.
8. In 1955, American President Izen Hover advocates for inspection by others about arms but U.S.S.R denied the proposal.
9. U.N.O founded IAEA in 1957 for promote peaceful of

atomic energy.
10. In 1954, Geneva Treaty -letter (dispatch) banned use of chemical arms.
11. In 1959, held Antartica Treaty. The Antartic Treaty imposed ban on all kind of military activities in Antarctic Indian region.
12. In 1954, Indian Prime Minister JawaharLal Nehru criticized atomic tests.
13. The General Assembly of U.N.O sent a draft of NPT in 1968.On signed by U.S.A and U.S.S.R in 1970, this treaty came into existence for 25 years (1968).
14. NPT was much impressive than PTBT (1963).
15. For the purpose of arms controlling in 1963, U.S.A, U.K and U.S.S.R signed on Moscow agreement.
16. India became atomic power after Atomic test at Pokharan in 1974.

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